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ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION: WHY IS 
CALIFORNIA LAGGING BEHIND? 
Michael Vitiello 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Until quite recently, America was on an incarceration binge for 
almost forty years.1 While the sharp increase in incarceration is 
almost certainly one cause of reduced crime rates in recent years,2 a 
broad consensus has emerged that we incarcerate too many people to 
the point of diminishing returns.3 Further, commentators across a 
broad political spectrum recognize that alternatives to incarceration 
are necessary, especially in light of the current budget crises in many 
states.4 They also agree that states can protect the public with sound 
sentencing policies while saving money by resorting to less costly 
alternatives to incarceration.5 
Critics of excessive incarceration include liberals,6 centrists,7 and 
conservatives8 outside the political arena. Proposals for reform vary, 
but many of their proposals share broad outlines for reform.9 In light 
of this consensus, one might have expected that sentencing reform 
                                                                                                                 
 Distinguished Professor and Scholar, the University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law; 
University of Pennsylvania, J.D., 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A., 1969. Special thanks to my research 
assistants R.J. Cooper and Ashley Connell for their research efforts and to Ashley for organizing their 
efforts. 
 1. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE 
REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S PRISONS (2011), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/State_
Recidivism_Revolving_Door_America_Prisons%20.pdf. 
 2. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 56 (2007). 
 3. See infra notes 74–119 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. See infra notes 74–119, Part III. 
 6. Michael Vitiello & Clark Kelso, A Proposal for a Wholesale Reform of California’s Sentencing 
Practice and Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 903, 952 (2004). 
 7. Background/Mission/Approach, PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/about_background.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 2011). 
 8. What’s Gone Wrong, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/the-criminal-justice-
challenge/whats-gone-wrong/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2011). 
 9. See infra notes 77–112 and accompanying text. 
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would have been easy to achieve nationwide. That has simply not 
been the case.10 
Many of us predicted that a weak economy would lead to 
sentencing reform.11 In some states, that has begun to take place. In 
recent years, both very conservative states, like Mississippi and 
Texas, and liberal states, like Washington, have achieved modest and 
sensible reforms.12 At least, early reports suggest that public safety 
has not been sacrificed.13 
California has the largest state prison system in the United States14 
and a gaping hole in its budget.15 As California’s economic crisis has 
become evident, some politicians have tried to advance modest 
reform proposals, including recourse to a sentencing commission16 
and compassionate release of older prisoners.17 But California 
politicians have largely rejected proposals that have proven 
successful elsewhere.18 Federal court intervention, affirmed by a 
divided Supreme Court, has kept some pressure on California 
politicians to reform a badly designed system.19 Recent legislation 
advanced by Governor Brown is a partial and relatively tame 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See infra Part VI. 
 11. See Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 6, at 952; Michael Santos, Economic Crisis Opens Possibilities 
for Prison Reform, PRISON NEWS BLOG (Mar. 4, 2009), http://prisonnewsblog.com/2009/03/economic-
crisis-opens-possibilities-for-prison-reform/. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Sonja Steptoe, California’s Growing Prison Crisis, TIME (June 21, 2007), 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1635592,00.html. 
 15. Claire Suddath, Spotlight: California’s Budget Crisis, TIME (July 27, 2009), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1910985-1,00.html. Complicating the problem for 
the state is the fact that the prison system consumes about eleven percent of discretionary spending. 
Randal C. Archibold, California, in Financial Crisis, Opens Doors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/us/24calprisons.html. Thus, its difficulty in reducing those costs 
has forced the state to reduce funds for education and safety net programs. Id. 
 16. Marisa Lagos & Wyatt Buchanan, Sen. Mark Leno Pushes for State Sentencing Panel, S.F. 
CHRON. (Aug. 6, 2011), http://articles.sfgate.com/2011-08-06/bay-area/29857542_1_sentencing-panel-
sentencing-commission-state-senator. 
 17. Promoting Inmate Rehabilitation and Successful Release Planning: Testimony Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 110th Cong. 42–56 (Dec. 6, 2007) [hereinafter 
Testimony Before the H. Subcomm.] (statement of Jonathan Turley). 
 18. See infra Part V. 
 19. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
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response to the problem.20 But the state missed a chance to enact a 
more sweeping reform.21 
This Article explores five themes. First, it discusses the consensus 
that has emerged among those calling for reform.22 Second, it 
examines how some states have responded to the call for reform.23 
Third, it reviews briefly the Court’s ruling in Brown v. Plata,24 
upholding the decision of a three-judge panel, requiring California to 
reduce the population of its prisons to comply with the Eighth 
Amendment.25 Fourth, it explores California’s efforts to reform its 
prison overcrowding, especially in response to the federal court 
intervention in its prison health care system.26 Fifth, it examines the 
unique situation in California: despite its liberalism, it has remained 
remarkably resistant to reform.27 Specifically, this article examines 
the role of the prison guards’ union,28 victims’ rights groups,29 myths 
surrounding the effect of Three Strikes,30 and term limits and a 
legislature consisting largely of safe districts31 in frustrating reform. 
Some commentators assumed that the federal court order in the 
prison health care cases would give California politicians cover, 
allowing them to back sensible reforms.32 Governor Brown’s 
realignment plan is a step towards broad reform, but quite tame when 
compared to other states and the size of California’s larger problems. 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 15 (West); infra notes 340–41 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 215–53 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra Part II. 
 23. See infra Part III. 
 24. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1910. 
 25. See infra Part IV. 
 26. See infra Part V. 
 27. See infra Part VI. 
 28. See infra notes 278–97 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra notes 289–313 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra notes 314–19 and accompanying text; 1994 Cal. Stat. Ch. 12, sec. 1 (enacting Cal. 
Penal Code § 667), and the initiative, Proposition 184. See California Ballot Pamphlet, General Election 
(Nov. 8, 1994). As developed at notes 315-18, Three Strikes’ proponents insist that crime rates were 
rising until enactment of Three Strikes, at which point, crime rates began their precipitous decline. They 
could argue that point only by skewing the data. 
 31. See infra notes 321–35 and accompanying text. 
 32. Marie Gottschalk, Prison Overcrowding and Brown v. Plata, NEW REPUBLIC (June 8, 2011), 
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/89575/prison-overcrowding-brown-plata-supreme-court-california. 
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As explored below, California has missed an opportunity for more 
meaningful reform.33 
II. A NATIONAL CONSENSUS 
Sentencing reform does occur in the United States. For example, 
between the early 1970s through the mid-1980s, groups on the center, 
left, and right all called for sentencing reform.34 While the consensus 
began to unravel after reform took hold,35 it led to an almost 
universal abandonment of indeterminate sentencing.36 A similar 
consensus seems to be emerging today. This section reviews the 
consensus that emerged during the 1960s, ‘70s, and ‘80s and then 
compares it with current reform efforts. 
Students of criminal justice today would have difficulty 
recognizing the dominant sentencing scheme in place during the 
1950s and 1960s. Based on a rehabilitative model,37 indeterminate 
sentencing gave judges wide latitude in imposing sentences38 and left 
a great deal of discretion to parole boards to set a release date for 
offenders.39 The prevailing model, grounded in faith of psychiatry 
and science,40 was so integrated into the legal culture that it 
influenced the Supreme Court’s case law in cases like Robinson v. 
California41 and Powell v. Texas.42 For example, in Robinson, the 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See infra notes 213–51 and accompanying text. 
 34. Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1014–15 (1991). 
 35. Id. at 1029–31. 
 36. Indeterminate sentencing was abandoned at the national level by the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3586, 3621–
3625, 3742 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2006)). Since the late 1970s, state after state has 
abandoned indeterminate sentencing in favor of determinate sentencing. Alternative Incarceration 
Program: Oregon’s “Alternative Incarceration Program,” 
http://www.crimevictimsunited.org/issues/corrections/aip.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
 37. AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 10 (1971); MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL 
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 89–90 (1973); RICHARD SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING 
BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT 1–2 (1979). 
 38. FRANKEL, supra note 37, at 89–90; SINGER, supra note 37, at 1–2, 10. 
 39. FRANKEL, supra note 37, at 87. 
 40. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 7 (1981); Willard Gaylin & 
David J. Rothman, Introduction to ANDREW VON HIRSCH, COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF INCARCERATION, 
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS, at xxxvii (Ne. Univ. Press 1986) (1976). 
 41. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 42. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
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Court held that a state violated the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment when it criminalized “a condition [a defendant] 
is powerless to change.”43 In Powell, the Court came close to holding 
that a state could not criminalize an alcoholic for public drunkenness 
because alcoholism was a disease that the alcoholic could not 
control.44 
The medical model came under attack from the left, right, and 
center. Prepared by the American Friends Service Committee, 
Struggle for Justice presented a radical attack on the medical model. 
It contended that “[m]uch penal reform has been infected 
with . . . paternalistic motives.”45 Managers of indeterminate 
sentencing and parole used them “as a tool of institutional control.”46 
The rehabilitative model, argued the authors, was a product of a class 
society. The treatment model allowed the system to treat upper and 
middle class criminals favorably because “they are not 
revolutionaries.”47 Consistent with the prevailing view at the time, 
Struggle for Justice gained traction because of the generally held 
view that parole and rehabilitation did not work.48 
Conservatives saw the medical model as mollycoddling 
criminals.49 They believed in retribution, not rehabilitation.50 Further, 
they believed in longer sentences for criminal offenders and for 
“truth in sentencing.”51 
More centrist in his assessment was Judge Marvin Frankel, whose 
book Criminal Sentences highlighted the inequities in the prevailing 
sentencing scheme.52 Judges’ discretion was “unchecked and 
sweeping,” inconsistent with our professed belief in the rule of law.53 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. at 566–67 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. at 561–62; Vitiello, supra note 34, at 1016. The four-Justice dissent appears to have been 
drafted initially as a majority opinion. Id. 
 45. AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 37, at 18. 
 46. Id. at 28. 
 47. Id. at 30. 
 48. Id. at 83–99. 
 49. Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 40, at xxxvii. 
 50. Todd R. Clear, Correctional Policy, Neo-Retributionism and the Determinate Sentence, 4 JUST. 
SYS. J. 26, 37–41 (1978). 
 51. Id. 
 52. FRANKEL, supra note 37. 
 53. Id. at 5. 
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Legislatures left judges without guidance even on fundamental 
questions, including why we punish.54 He saw the system as allowing 
“untrained, untested, unsupervised men armed with great power [to] 
perpetuate abuses.”55 Like the authors of Struggle for Justice, he saw 
the parole process as flawed, lacking meaningful standards, and 
providing no means of “curing” inmates.56 
The emerging consensus culminated in the move towards 
sentencing guidelines and commissions. After an unsuccessful effort 
to pass legislation in the 1970s,57 Congress enacted the Sentencing 
Reform Act in 1984.58 It limited judicial discretion in sentencing by 
forcing judges to consider detailed sentencing guidelines.59 The Act 
limited judges’ discretion to deviate from the guidelines.60 Judges 
were to give written explanations for deviating from the guidelines, 
subjecting their decisions to appellate review.61 The Act also 
eliminated parole.62 
The consensus that led to abandonment of the rehabilitative model 
started to fall apart almost immediately. By the time Congress put its 
new sentencing scheme into place, law-and-order advocates were 
rising in power.63 The victims’ rights movement gained traction 
locally and nationally.64 Freed from the constraints of the 
rehabilitative model, retributivists called for longer and longer 
sentences.65 One needs only to think back to the 1988 presidential 
election and President George H. W. Bush’s Willie Horton ad66 to 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. at 7. 
 55. Id. at 17. 
 56. Id. at 95. 
 57. LISA SEGHETTI & ALISON SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32766, FEDERAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES: BACKGROUND, LEGAL ANALYSIS, AND POLICY OPTIONS 11 (2007), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32766.pdf. 
 58. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted as Chapter II of the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 
3551–3586, 3621–3625, 3742 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2006)). 
 59. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 51 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3220, 3234. 
 60. 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)–(b) (1988). 
 61. Id. §§ 3553(c), 3742(a)–(b). 
 62. Id. § 3624(a)–(b). 
 63. Clear, supra note 50, at 37–41. 
 64. JOSHUA PAGE, THE TOUGHEST BEAT 83 (2011). 
 65. Clear, supra note 50, at 37–41. 
 66. Editorial, George Bush and Willie Horton, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1988, at A34, available at 
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recognize the dramatic shift from Americans’ view of crime in the 
1960s and the 1980s. The widespread adoption of three strikes laws 
in the 1990s was the culmination of fixed minimum sentences and 
exceedingly long prison terms, often for relatively minor offenses.67 
These trends have resulted in massive increases in total 
incarceration around the country.68 Despite dissatisfaction among 
liberals with the result of sentencing reform, the dramatic shift in 
sentencing policy was the product of the consensus built in the 1970s, 
a consensus which included many liberals.69 
I see a similar consensus emerging outside the political arena, a 
consensus across a broad political spectrum.70 For most of the past 
decade, those groups have recognized that states and the federal 
government spend too much on prisons, that mandatory minimum 
sentences and long prison sentences are counterproductive, and that 
states can maintain public safety without such high levels of spending 
on prisons.71 
In planning a ten-year retrospective on California’s Three Strikes 
law, a colleague and I decided not to focus only on law but to 
broaden the inquiry to focus on sentencing reform generally.72 
California’s prison budget was out of control even before the worst 
of the recession hit the state.73 The problem of prison overcrowding 
resulted not just from Three Strikes but also from an extraordinary 
number of sentencing enhancement provisions, satisfying the desire 
of politicians to address the crime “du jour.”74 Our report discussed 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/04/opinion/george-bush-and-willie-horton.html; Willie Horton 1988 
Attack Ad, YOUTUBE (Nov. 3, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Io9KMSSEZ0Y. 
 67. PAGE, supra note 64, at 117–18. 
 68. Id. at 133. But see VINCENT SCHIRALDI, JASON COLBURN & ERIK LOTKE, JUSTICE POLICY 
INST., THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF 3-STRIKE LAWS 10 
YEARS AFTER THEIR ENACTMENT, (2004), available at 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/04-09_rep_threestrikesnatl_ac.pdf.pdf 
(stating that as of 2004, fourteen states out of the twenty-two states with Three Strikes laws and 
available data had fewer than 100 prisoners sentenced under the Three Strikes laws). 
 69. Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 40, at xxxvii. 
 70. See infra notes 81–122 and accompanying text. 
 71. See infra notes 81–122 and accompanying text. 
 72. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 6, at 903. 
 73. CORR. INDEP. REVIEW PANEL, REFORMING CORRECTIONS, at i-ii (2004), available at 
http://www.cpr.ca.gov/Review_Panel/pdf/introto6.pdf; Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 6, at 908–09. 
 74. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 6, at 916–17, 921. 
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several bipartisan efforts aimed at addressing the crisis of prison 
overcrowding and overuse of prison as the only punishment.75 
Justice Kennedy’s speech to the American Bar Association (ABA) 
in 2003 touched on many of the current system’s excesses.76 He 
argued that America spends too much on prisons and that “our 
punishments [are] too severe [and] our sentences [are] too long.”77 
He urged that federal sentences be revised downward.78 He 
questioned the use of mandatory minimum sentences.79 His speech 
was a national call to action.80 
In response to the challenge, the ABA established a commission 
whose report advocated many ideas for reform shared by an 
increasing number of experts.81 Representative of several reports 
from the mid-2000s, the commission’s report urged the repeal of 
mandatory minimum sentences.82 It urged adoption of sentencing 
systems that both guide judicial discretion and permit judges to 
consider unique characteristics of offenders and their offenses.83 The 
commission urged creation of an entity that should monitor the 
sentencing system; that entity should urge alternatives to 
incarceration for some offenders.84 It should also assess the financial 
impact of new legislation on crime rates and racial disparity in 
sentencing.85 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Id. at 952–65. 
 76. Id. at 909–10; Justice Anthony Kennedy, Speech at the Am. Bar Ass’n Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 
2003), available at http://www.abanow.org/2003/08/speech-by-justice-anthony-kennedy-at-aba-annual-
meeting/. 
 77. See Kennedy, supra note 76. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. AM. BAR ASS’N., JUSTICE KENNEDY COMMISSION, REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 17 
(2004), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_k
ennedy_JusticeKennedyCommissionReportsFinal.authcheckdam.pdf; Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 6, at 
909–11. 
 82. AM. BAR ASS’N., supra note 81, at 9. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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Elsewhere, organizations like the American Law Institute (ALI) 
have advanced similar proposals.86 For over a decade, a committee of 
the ALI, for example, has been working on revisions to the Model 
Penal Code sentencing provisions.87 Several principles have 
emerged, including disapproval of mandatory minimum sentences;88 
evidence-based sentencing;89 proportionality constraints on 
sentences;90 procedures to allow “second looks” at long-term 
sentences; and modifications of prison sentences based on an 
assortment of policies, including advanced age, mental infirmity, and 
exigent family circumstances.91 
Organizations like the Vera Institute for Justice92 and the Pew 
Charitable Trust93 have funded a variety of studies of the prison, 
probation, and parole systems. For example, the Vera Institute has 
published a detailed report on New York’s use of alternatives to 
incarceration.94 It reported that offenders placed in an alternative 
program, in which they spent far less time in jail than similar situated 
offenders, provided the same level of public protection at a 
significantly lower cost.95 
The Pew Charitable Trust has been at the forefront of the crisis of 
over-incarceration.96 It has identified the problem of overreliance on 
incarceration and has funded studies aimed at lowering incarceration 
rates while protecting the public.97 Using traditional media, it has 
attempted to keep in front of the public positive developments aimed 
                                                                                                                 
 86. See generally, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (outlining 
various sentencing reform proposals). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Center on Sentencing and Corrections, VERA INST. JUST., http://www.vera.org/centers/center-
sentencing-corrections (last visited Dec. 22, 2011). 
 93. Sentencing and Corrections, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_detail.aspx?id=74 (last visited Dec. 22, 2011). 
 94. RACHEL PORTER, SOPHIA LEE & MARY LUTZ, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, BALANCING 
PUNISHMENT AND TREATMENT: ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION IN NEW YORK CITY (2002), 
available at http://www.vera.org/download?file=75/Balancing%2520ATI.pdf. 
 95. Id. at 64–66. 
 96. See Sentencing and Corrections, supra note 93. 
 97. See, e.g., PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 1. 
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at those goals.98 In an extensive report published in 2011, the Pew 
Center on the States studied recidivism rates around the country.99 It 
explored, for example, why Wyoming and Oregon have the lowest 
recidivism rates in the country, while California and Minnesota have 
the highest.100 It explored why some states have experienced sharp 
declines in recidivism while others have experienced sharp increases 
in rates of recidivism.101 The report identified the problem of 
diminishing returns that states experience when they continue to 
expand their prison systems.102 The report provides state officials 
interested in sensible use of resources with a variety of strategies, 
including reentry strategies that successfully reduce recidivism.103 
Before the abandonment of indeterminate sentencing, critics of the 
system pointed to evidence that rehabilitation did not work.104 By 
comparison, today, those interested in alternatives to prison cite an 
increasing body of literature suggesting that many alternatives to 
prison do work.105 They can point to a host of innovative programs 
that have produced positive results.106 Many of those programs have 
been validated with follow-up studies.107 Further, because most such 
programs do not resort to prison, they are far less expensive than the 
incarceration alternative.108 
                                                                                                                 
 98. See, e.g., Sue Urahn, How Red-Ink States Should Make Tough Budget Decisions, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Apr. 20, 2011), 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/news_room_detail.aspx?id=85899358938. 
 99. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 1. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 17–23. 
 102. Id. at 5–6. 
 103. Id. at 25–32. 
 104. See AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 37; FRANKEL, supra note 37, at 89–90; Gaylin & 
Rothman, supra note 40, at 45–55. Many critics cited Robert Martinson’s work suggesting that 
rehabilitation was a failure. Ironically, by the time Congress and states began abandoning indeterminate 
sentencing, Martinson had retracted the conclusions of his earlier work. Robert Martinson, New 
Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243, 252 
(1979). 
 105. See MARK A. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME AND LESS 
PUNISHMENT 35–48 (2009); PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 1, at 25–32. 
 106. See KLEIMAN, supra note 105, at 35–48; PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 1, at 25–32. 
 107. See PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 1. 
 108. KLEIMAN, supra note 105, at 34. 
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As developed below,109 campaigning by portraying one’s opponent 
as “soft on crime” remains attractive to some politicians. But outside 
the political arena, some conservatives have joined the call for 
sentencing reform. Several years ago, prominent California 
conservative Ward Connerly published an op-ed piece in which he 
laid out a conservative’s argument for sentencing reform.110 Other 
prominent conservatives soon echoed Connerly’s position. 
In January 2011, Newt Gingrich and Pat Nolan authored an op-ed 
in The Washington Post summarizing a major shift in conservative 
thinking about crime in the United States.111 Some prominent 
conservative leaders, including Gingrich and Connerly, have become 
part of the Right on Crime campaign, a movement which calls for 
“sensible and proven reforms to our criminal justice system—policies 
that will cut prison costs while keeping the public safe.”112 While few 
current politicians have signed on to the campaign, signatories 
include powerful political players, including former Attorney General 
Ed Meese, former drug czar Asa Hutchinson, and anti-tax leader 
Grover Norquist.113 The Right on Crime webpage lists former Florida 
Governor Jeb Bush as its most recent signatory.114 According to 
Gingrich and Nolan, this initiative “opens the way for a common-
sense left-right agreement on an issue that has kept the parties apart 
for decades.”115 
The Right on Crime campaign has roots in traditional conservative 
thought. For example, conservatives expect government 
accountability for programs that it runs.116 As observed on Right on 
Crime’s webpage: “As members of the nation’s conservative 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See infra text accompanying notes 110–20. 
 110. Ward Connerly, Don’t Raise Taxes, But Reform Prisons, Special to the Sacramento Bee, Sept. 4, 
2009, at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/PrisonNewsNetwork/message/38110. 
 111. Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, Op-Ed., Prison Reform: A Smart Way for States to Save Money and 
Lives, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/01/06/AR2011010604386.html. 
 112. Id. For a complete list of the signatories, see Statement of Principles: National Signatories, 
RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/the-conservative-case-for-reform/statement-of-
principles/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2011). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Gingrich & Nolan, supra note 111. 
 116.  Statement of Principles: National Signatories, supra note 112. 
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movement, we strongly support constitutionally limited government, 
transparency, individual liberty, personal responsibility, and free 
enterprise.”117 While liberals and centrists may not join all of the 
proposals supported by the Right on Crime campaign,118 those 
signing on to the campaign concur in the core of the message 
emerging elsewhere. In calling for more cost-effective approaches to 
criminal justice spending, the website lists as an example of 
ineffective governmental spending “our reliance on prisons, which 
serve a critical role by incapacitating dangerous offenders but are not 
the solution for every type of offender. And in some instances, they 
have the unintended consequence of hardening nonviolent, low-risk 
offenders–making them greater risk to the public than when they 
entered.”119 
At least on several key issues, a consensus has emerged across a 
broad political spectrum, similar to the consensus that emerged 
briefly in the 1970s, which in turn led to sentencing reform.120 I do 
not want to overstate the case. Politics have changed since the 1970s 
and 1980s. The Republicans’ performance in the summer of 2011, 
when they held the nation hostage before voting to raise the debt 
ceiling, suggests how far we have come from what now seems like a 
kinder, gentler era when conservative icon Ronald Reagan was 
President.121 But at least outside of the political arena, a consensus 
has emerged that America overuses incarceration and reform is 
necessary. 
III. RED STATE BLUE STATE: REFORM CAN HAPPEN 
As I indicated in the previous section, some prominent 
conservatives have joined the emerging consensus supporting 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. 
 118. For example, among their proposals is an endorsement of faith-based initiatives. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See supra text accompanying notes 34–69. 
 121. President Barack Obama, Speech on the Debt Limit (July 25, 2011), available at 
http://washingtonexaminer.com/blogs/beltway-confidential/2011/07/transcript-obamas-speech-debt-
limit. 
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sentencing reform.122 Critics have come to that recognition for 
different policy reasons.123 Nonetheless, critics of the overuse of 
incarceration have identified a handful of concrete proposals whereby 
states can reduce prison costs without endangering public safety.124 
This section reviews developments taking place in different states.125 
Faced with financial exigencies, policy makers have begun to look 
for ways to reduce prison costs.126 Some state legislators have 
adopted some of the ideas advanced by critics of the current system 
of incarceration.127 Reforms have taken place in some unlikely 
places. This section reviews some of the reforms adopted in a 
traditionally blue state, Washington,128 and then reviews reforms in 
two states known for their conservative politics, Texas129 and 
Mississippi.130 
A.   Washington’s Reform 
Similar to California, Washington experienced dramatic prison 
population growth in the 1990s and early 2000s after the passage of a 
“Three Strikes and You’re Out” law and a “Hard Time for Armed 
Crime” law (similar to California’s 10-20-Life law).131 But unlike 
California, Washington has reformed its sentencing laws, parole 
mechanisms, and earned-time mechanisms. This subsection discusses 
                                                                                                                 
 122. See supra text accompanying notes 109–22. 
 123. Charlie Savage, Trend to Lighten Harsh Sentences Catches On in Conservative States, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/us/13penal.html?_r=3&hpw. 
 124. See supra text accompanying notes 93–108. 
 125. This section does not discuss some of the earlier efforts at reform. During the move toward 
sentencing guidelines, some states recognized that their prison resources were finite and that they 
needed to make better use of those resources. Some states like North Carolina and Virginia were able to 
limit prison growth without sacrificing public safety by designating prison beds for violent offenders. 
Sentencing: Guidelines—Guidelines and Prison Population, LAW LIBRARY, 
http://law.jrank.org/pages/2067/Sentencing-Guidelines-Guidelines-prison-populations.html (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2011). 
 126. Savage, supra note 123. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See infra text accompanying notes 131–43. 
 129. See infra text accompanying notes 155–76. 
 130. See infra text accompanying notes 144–54. 
 131. Vincent Schiraldi, The Modern American Penal System: Digging Out as U.S. States Begin to 
Reduce Prison Use, Can American Turn the Corner on its Imprisonment Binge?, 24 PACE L. REV. 563, 
572–73 (2004). 
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some of the reforms Washington has made to curb prison population 
growth. 
Even though Washington is one of many states with a truth-in-
sentencing law, the Washington Legislature passed Senate Bill 44, 
which “increased the amount of earned-release time available to most 
drug and property offenders from 33 to 50 percent of their 
sentences.”132 Additionally, in an attempt to lower the recidivism 
rate, Washington also passed legislation dedicating $3 million to pre-
release treatment programs.133 It is estimated that this legislation will 
save the state $40 million over a two-year period.134 
Another reform bill passed by the legislature, House Bill 2194, 
authorizes the early release of certain individuals if they meet 
specified criteria. A form of compassionate release, this law 
considers the risk to the community of early release, the cost of 
medical treatment, and the estimated savings to the state.135 
Washington reduced the number of parolees reentering the prison 
system for technical parole violations by passing Senate Bill 5990, 
which effectively discontinued supervision of released low-level 
felons.136 The Washington legislature enacted the Washington 
Sentencing Commission (the Commission) in 1981 with the passage 
of the Sentencing Reform Act.137 The legislature created a sentencing 
commission dependent on the state legislature, gave the Commission 
only advisory power, and the Commission is required to consider 
prison resources and prison capacity when recommending guidelines 
to the state legislature.138 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Don Stemen & Jon Wool, Changing Fortunes or Changing Attitudes? Sentencing and 
Corrections Reforms in 2003, 16 FED. SENT. R. 294, 297 (2004). 
 133. Id. at 304. 
 134. JUDITH A. GREENE, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, POSITIVE TRENDS IN STATE-
LEVEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS POLICY 7 (2003), available at 
http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/82751_Positive%20Trends.pdf. 
 135. NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2009: 
DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 14 (2010), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/s_ssr2009Update.pdf. 
 136. Stemen & Wool, supra note 132, at 298. 
 137. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 777 (2005). 
 138. Id. at 780. 
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Although the Commission has no power to implement policy or 
enact legislation, the Commission has had an impact on Washington 
state prison reform.139 For example, the Commission’s guidelines 
influenced the Washington legislature’s enactment of alternative 
treatment programs for drug offenders such as Senate Bill 5990.140 
Further, after reviewing a report published by the Commission in 
2001, which analyzed and reviewed the sentencing laws and 
treatment programs, the legislature enacted reforms that saved the 
state an estimated $45 million per year.141 
Not only did Senate Bill 5990 reform the parole system in 
Washington, the bill also reformed the sentencing of drug offenders 
across the board. The law, which implemented the Drug Sentence 
Reform Act of 2002, “significantly reduces sentences for all drug 
offenses.”142 Met with the same fiscal challenges as other states, 
Washington passed these sentencing reforms with bipartisan support. 
These reforms, spearheaded by Washington Corrections Secretary 
Joseph Lehman, included treatment for low-level, nonviolent drug 
offenders, to be managed and supervised by drug court judges instead 
of prison wardens. Additionally, the reform package reduced 
sentences for prisoners convicted of drug trafficking. This particular 
reform package was estimated to save the state “almost $75 million 
in correctional costs and avert the need to build more than 2,000 new 
prison cells.”143 
B.   Mississippi’s Reform 
Although Mississippi is one of the most conservative states in the 
nation, the state has made significant strides toward reducing its 
prison population and reforming its prison system. Mississippi 
expanded its early release mechanism, releasing 1,300 inmates in 
2008-2009 alone. Mississippi Department of Corrections 
Commissioner Chris Epps is largely responsible for reducing 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Id. at 781–82. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 781. 
 142. Stemen & Wool, supra note 132, at 298. 
 143. GREENE, supra note 134. 
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Mississippi’s prison population and reforming sentencing laws. In 
2008, Epps spearheaded an effort to amend Mississippi’s truth-in-
sentencing law to allow nonviolent inmates to serve only 25% of 
their sentence before “becoming eligible for release,” compared to 
the original 85%.144 To further reduce Mississippi’s prison 
population, the legislature enacted Senate Bill 2039, removing the 
cap on earned time for inmates participating and completing 
educational programs.145 The previous law capped earned time at “10 
days off of their sentence for 30 days participation,” and the 
maximum amount of earned time was capped at 180 days off their 
sentence.146 Senate Bill 2039 removed both caps.147 Additionally, 
Mississippi expanded the state’s compassionate release mechanism 
by passing House Bill 494. The new law mandates that nonviolent, 
terminally-ill offenders are eligible for release, “regardless of the 
time served on their sentence.”148 
To further save space in the prisons for violent offenders, 
Mississippi invested in alternatives to traditional incarceration. 
Mississippi’s most significant reforms have been in the area of house 
arrest. In 2009, Mississippi approved house arrest for 518 drug 
offenders—prior to 2009 “most drug offenders didn’t qualify for 
house arrest.”149 It was estimated that such a change in law would 
save the state $5 million annually.150 In addition to providing another 
alternative to traditional incarceration, Mississippi’s restitution 
centers have many other benefits. Restitution centers allow inmates 
convicted of property crimes to “work to repay the victims they owe” 
at “less than half the cost of the State Penitentiary.”151 Not only do 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Jimmie E. Gates, Inmates Get Early Release, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Nov. 29, 2009, 
available at 2009 WLNR 24110992. 
 145. PORTER, supra note 135, at 13. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 13–14. 
 148. RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2008: DEVELOPMENTS 
IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/sl_statesentencingreport2008.pdf. 
 149. Gates, supra note 144. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Jerry Mitchell, Lawmakers Look To Stave Off Prison Overcrowding, CLARION-LEDGER 
(Jackson, Miss.), Dec. 12, 2000, at 1A. 
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the restitution programs save the state money, but they also provide 
rehabilitation, allowing the inmates to keep a portion of their 
earnings and opening opportunities for employment.152 Both 
alternatives to imprisonment have successfully helped to reduce 
Mississippi prison populations and thereby save the state money. 
At one time Mississippi was one of the nation’s “most aggressive 
incarcerators”; now Mississippi is reaping the rewards of its reforms. 
Not only has Mississippi reduced “its corrections budget by about 
5%” since 2008, it did so with little danger to the public.153 
Mississippi’s violent crime rates have fallen “toward 1970s levels, 
and the state’s recidivism rate has decreased to 30% in the last four 
years—well below the national average.”154 
C.   Texas’s Reform 
Another conservative state, Texas, could no longer afford to build 
new prisons without questioning the underlying system. The reforms 
in Texas are indicative of a new movement on the right—epitomized 
by the group “Right on Crime”—preaching fiscal responsibility over 
the old “lock ‘em up and throw away the key” approach. Texas has 
invested in alternatives to incarceration, reformed its parole system, 
made early-release and earned-release reforms, and made reforms to 
juvenile sentencing, all with positive impacts on Texans’ safety and 
pocket books. 
Texas prevented the construction of additional prisons by investing 
in alternatives to traditional incarceration. Where some states have 
invested in house arrest devices (such as Mississippi), Texas has 
invested in transitional programs for inmates, specifically “treatment-
oriented programs.”155 Texas “allocated $241 million for residential 
and non-residential treatment-oriented programs for non-violent 
                                                                                                                 
 152. Id. 
 153. Steven Gray, Why Mississippi Is Reversing Its Prison Policy, TIME (June 10, 2011), 
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,2077089,00.html. 
 154. Id. 
 155. State Initiatives: Texas, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com/reform-in-action/state-
initiatives/texas/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2011). 
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offenders, along with enhancing in-prison treatment programs.”156 
The Texas legislature continued funding for the programs in 2009 
and expanded the services provided by hiring more reentry 
transitional coordinators.157 
Another important way Texas avoided the need for additional 
prisons was House Bill 2668.158 With the passage of House Bill 
2668, first-time drug offenders possessing less than one gram of 
drugs receive mandatory probation versus prison time.159 
Additionally, the law gives judges the discretion to sentence 
probation with treatment for drug possession offenders that have 
prior felony convictions.160 The estimated savings of this law alone 
are $30 million over a five-year period and a reduction of the prison 
population by 2,500.161 
Not only has Texas reformed its sentencing laws by expanding the 
number of offenders eligible for probation, the state has also 
implemented reforms to the parole system, reducing the number of 
parolees returning to state prison. In a little over a year, the Texas 
prison population decreased by 8,000 inmates because of parole 
reforms implemented in 2000.162 Texas “created a network of 
intermediate sanctions in lieu of parole revocation,” while the Texas 
Parole Board exercised their “release powers.”163 Such changes 
dramatically affected the Texas prison population and the Texas 
budget. 
With the passage of House Bill 93,164 inmates can regain their 
good time forfeited by “cooperation or good behavior” while 
incarcerated.165 Previously, once good time credit was forfeited, an 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Id. 
 157. Richard Fausset, Conservatives Latch Onto Prison Reform, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/28/nation/la-na-conservative-crime-20110129. 
 158. H.R. 2668, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003). 
 159. State Initiatives: Texas, supra note 135. 
 160. Stemen & Wool, supra note 132, at 299. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Schiraldi, supra note 131, at 577–78. 
 163. Id. 
 164. H.R. 93, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2010). 
 165. PORTER, supra note 135, at 14. 
18
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 10
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss4/10
2012] ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION 1291 
inmate could not earn back the credit.166 Not only will this change in 
the law positively impact an inmate’s behavior while incarcerated, it 
will also have some impact on reducing the prison population 
(though no estimates were provided). 
The Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bill 839167 in 2009, 
eliminating juvenile sentences of life without parole.168 Senate Bill 
839 corrected previous law that placed all juvenile offenders 
convicted of capital offenses in the sentencing category of life 
without parole by default.169 With the passage of Senate Bill 839, a 
juvenile “serving a life sentence for a capital offense is eligible for 
parole after he or she has completed 40 years of their sentence.”170 
All of Texas’s prison reforms have amounted to less violent 
crimes, less inmates, and less of the state budget going to corrections. 
Texas reforms are hailed as a model for other conservative states 
looking to implement prison reforms to save money.171 Texas crime 
rates have declined since the implementation of the above-discussed 
reform packages, even when other states on average saw an increase 
in incarceration rates.172 
Serious property, violent, and sex crimes per 100,000 
Texas residents have declined 12.8 percent since 2003. 
Such crimes per 100,000 residents fell 7.3 percent from 
2005 to 2008. From 2007 to 2008, there was a 5 percent 
drop in murders, a 4.3 percent drop in robberies, and a 6.8 
percent decline in forcible rapes. The number of parolees 
convicted of a new crime declined 7.6 percent from 2007 to 
2008, despite an increase in the number of parolees. The 
2008 per capita crime rate in Dallas was at its lowest level 
in 40 years, declining 10 percent from 2007. It dropped 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Id. 
 167. S. 839, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009). 
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another 10.7 percent through August 31, 2009.173 
And with crime and incarceration rates on the decline for Texas, 
Texas has saved an estimated $2 billion by reforming the existing 
prison system in lieu of expanding it.174 
Serious criminologists often confess uncertainty about what causes 
the decline in crime rates.175 But the results from states like 
Washington, Mississippi, and Texas, among other states, are 
encouraging.176 They demonstrate that reform efforts can cut costs 
without impairing public safety. What about California, a state that is 
struggling financially and that has the largest prison system in the 
nation? Can it achieve similarly meaningful sentencing reforms? 
IV. BROWN V. PLATA: CALIFORNIA’S CHANCE AT REFORM? 
A panel of three federal judges may have given California its best 
shot at meaningful sentencing reform. This section discusses briefly 
the litigation in Brown v. Plata177 and explores how it may provide 
California with the opportunity to reform its broken system.178 
The Court’s decision in Brown v. Plata involved consolidated 
cases. Filed in 1990 as a class action, Coleman v. Brown challenged 
the legality of the mental health care provided by the California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR).179 Coleman 
resulted in a finding that the mental healthcare provided by the prison 
system violated inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights. The court 
entered an injunction in 1995 and appointed a special master to 
                                                                                                                 
 173. State Initiatives: Texas, supra note 155. 
 174. Fausset, supra note 157. 
 175. ZIMRING, supra note 2, at 23–24; Franklin Zimring: “The Decline in Crime in New York City,” 
VERA INST. JUST. (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.vera.org/videos/franklin-zimring-decline-crime-new-
york-city. 
 176. PORTER, supra note 135, at 13–14. 
 177. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
 178. See infra text accompanying notes 205–15. 
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(June 20, 2005), http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0620/p03s02-usju.html. 
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determine the state’s compliance with the injunction. The special 
master’s repeated interim reports found a “troubling reversal in the 
progress of the remedial efforts of the preceding decade.”180 
Filed as a class action in 2001, Plata v. Brown challenged the 
adequacy of health care provided by the CDCR.181 The complaint 
included a host of grievances about the system, including inadequate 
screening of prisoners, untimely health care in response to 
emergencies, lack of competent medical personnel, and lack of 
adequate review of the care that physicians did provide.182 The 
plaintiffs alleged that inadequate medical care resulted in over thirty 
deaths.183 In 2002, after the parties negotiated a stipulation for 
injunctive relief, the court entered an order requiring the CDCR to 
provide the minimum level of care consistent with the Eighth 
Amendment.184 
To carry out this order, the court appointed a receiver to take over 
the prison health care system.185 Three years later, the court found 
continued existence of appalling conditions resulting from the failure 
of CDCR to provide even minimally acceptable medical care.186 The 
continued failure of the state led the plaintiffs to petition for the 
appointment of a three-judge panel, an order that was granted.187 
After extensive proceedings, including a fourteen-day trial, the 
three-judge panel ordered the defendants to submit a plan to reduce 
the state’s prison population within two years.188 The state had to 
reduce the population to 137.5% of the design capacity.189 The court 
based its order to reduce the prison population on the finding that 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520LKKJFMP, 2009 WL 2430820, at *17 (E.D. 
Cal. 2009). 
 181. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1917. 
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overcrowding and poor health care led to the harm suffered by 
members of the class.190 Over the period of the litigation, the prison 
population averaged 190% of the system’s designed capacity.191 
Despite headlines to the contrary,192 the three-judge panel did not 
order the release of prisoners. Instead, while it recommended 
reductions in the population, for example, by reducing the 
imprisonment of nonviolent offenders, it did not compel the manner 
in which the state had to comply with the order.193 Further, the three-
judge panel indicated frustration with the state’s repeated failures to 
comply with previous orders.194 
Decided by a vote of 5–4, Brown v. Plata upheld the lower court 
order.195 Justice Kennedy’s opinion recounted some of the horrible 
conditions that resulted from overcrowding, including as many as 
fifty sick inmates held in twelve-by-twenty foot cages for up to five 
hours while they awaited medical treatment, fifty-four prisoners 
sharing a single toilet, a suicide rate nearly twice the national average 
for prisons, and waiting periods of up to a year to get mental health 
care.196 While the Court affirmed the lower court, it noted the state’s 
options other than releasing prisoners.197 
Justice Kennedy returned to themes he raised in his 2003 speech to 
the ABA. He discussed findings by experts on crime and punishment, 
including raising questions about mass incarceration and public 
safety.198 He contrasted the experience in other states, some of which 
have reduced their prison populations without impairing public 
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 193. Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820, at *84. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011). 
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safety.199 He cited studies suggesting that prisons may be 
crimogenic.200 
Given the protracted litigation in Plata, the state has had years to 
seek solutions to overcrowding.201 The three-judge panel and 
Supreme Court decisions still leave open the opportunity to re-
petition the court if it cannot comply with the order.202 In the next 
section, I explore California’s response to Plata and other 
developments in the state.203 At this point, Plata contains good and 
bad news for reform-minded observers of the system. 
Obviously, the majority kept some pressure on the state to reform 
its prison system and, perhaps, its sentencing scheme.204 A contrary 
holding would have allowed the state to go back to its old habits of 
largely ignoring the problem by providing a few minor reforms. 
A less obvious benefit of Justice Kennedy’s opinion can be seen in 
his endorsement of social science research.205 Policymakers have 
ignored social scientists and academic lawyers for many years. Frank 
Zimring and his co-authors summarized the problem in Punishment 
and Democracy: Three Strikes and You’re Out in California: 
[E]xpert influence on the process and expert involvement in 
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the process have declined. . . . [For example, t]he Model 
Penal Code effort of the American Law Institute brought 
the best and the brightest in academic law into the process 
of substantive criminal law reform. But there is now a large 
gap between law professors and the legislative 
process. . . . Part of the problem is that most academic 
lawyers are not much interested in criminal justice policy 
processes. Most of the problem is that there is no demand 
for what experts have to offer, which is information about 
the implications and consequences of policy choices.206 
Led by Justice Kennedy, the Plata majority seemed open to 
rethinking the role of experts in formulating criminal justice 
policy.207 In effect, Plata gives credence to the kinds of studies cited 
above, indicating that alternatives to prison work.208 
The bad news in Plata can be found in its fragile majority. Perhaps 
to hold together the slim majority, Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
suggests a host of alternatives open to the state that fall short of 
forcing the state to enact meaningful sentencing reform.209 Further, 
Plata hedges on the timing of final implementation of the three-judge 
panel’s order.210 That may take additional pressure off the state if it 
believes that it can go back to its old habits of delay. While I lack a 
crystal ball, post-Plata developments fall short of the broader reform 
needed by the state. 
V. CALIFORNIA’S RESPONSE 
Even before Plata, commentators have speculated that California’s 
budget crisis would force the state to consider comprehensive 
sentencing reform. For example, I, along with several co-authors, 
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speculated in 2004 that “California’s budget woes provide an 
opportunity to reexamine policies that have led to dramatic prison 
increases. The California budget has few areas of discretionary 
spending. Further, the prison budget is one budget item that has 
undergone little scrutiny.”211 Prior to Plata, however, California’s 
efforts at reform had been tepid at best. As indicated above,212 Plata 
may provide the state with the impetus to tackle sentencing reform. 
This section reviews the limited efforts at reform prior to Plata213 and 
the state’s short-term response to Plata.214 
Faced with similar budgetary crises over a decade ago, several 
states used sentencing commissions to allocate limited prison 
resources.215 Notably, states like North Carolina have been able to 
reallocate prison resources, reserving longer sentences for violent 
offenders, without endangering the public.216 
By comparison, efforts at creating a sentencing commission in 
California have gone nowhere. Such efforts have had a great deal of 
academic support,217 as well as support from various non-partisan 
organizations like the Little Hoover Institute.218 For example, 
Stanford’s Criminal Justice Center sponsored executive sessions on 
sentencing reform that brought together participants from various 
backgrounds, including academics, policymakers, politicians, and 
members of several organizations like the California Correctional 
Peace Officers Association (CCPOA) that have a stake in sentencing 
reform.219 But that kind of reform has floundered in the political 
arena. Various Democratic legislators have proposed legislation 
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creating a commission.220 At one point, then-Governor 
Schwarzenegger proposed a sentencing commission.221 Those efforts 
went nowhere.222 
California does have in place a compassionate release program, 
allowing the Parole Hearings Board to order the release of terminally 
ill prisoners.223 But as some recent headlines make clear, the board is 
hardly opening the prison doors.224 At various times, the legislature 
has considered a more general program for older prisoners.225 Those 
efforts have gone nowhere,226 despite an aging prison population that 
is expensive to maintain.227 
Thus far, California’s primary response to Plata has been the 
enactment of Assembly Bill 109, the Public Safety Realignment 
Act.228 Importantly, Assembly Bill 109 became law without a single 
Republican member of the legislature voting for it.229 The legislation 
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does not require the release of currently incarcerated prisoners.230 It 
does shift responsibility from the state to county governments in a 
number of areas. 
Instead of sending many lower level, non-violent felons and parole 
violators to state prisons, the Act now shifts responsibility for those 
offenders to the counties.231 The proponents of realignment intend the 
Act to do more than simply shift responsibility for prisoners from the 
state to the counties. The legislative findings noted the high 
recidivism rate in California.232 Assembly Bill 109, therefore, 
encourages local governments to use evidence-based sanctions and 
programs “encompassing a range of custodial and noncustodial 
responses to criminal or noncompliant offender activity.”233 While 
providing the counties with additional funds, the Act envisions local 
governments saving money by shifting to less expensive 
interventions, like drug treatment, home arrest and other alternatives 
to jail and prison.234 The law also encourages counties to adopt a 
variety of other cost-savings alternatives, including alternatives to 
expensive booking and arraignment processes. Instead, counties may 
direct consenting offenders directly into treatment programs.235 The 
law also includes a recommendation that local governments adopt 
evidence-based reentry programs addressing housing, education, 
employment, and health status of individuals released back into the 
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community.236 Again, the expectation of the drafters of the law is that 
such programs will reduce recidivism.237 
The Act also requires counties to develop implementation plans.238 
Reminding county officials that the Brown Act requires open 
meetings,239 the law anticipates participation of stakeholders, 
including providers of health, drug treatments, and other social 
services along with local business interests.240 
Realignment holds some promise. Policymakers seem to have 
taken notice of some of the current trends elsewhere. For example, 
although not directly requiring evidence-based practices, the law 
encourages counties to adopt such practices.241 In addition, it 
suggests adoption of practices found effective at reducing recidivism 
in other jurisdictions.242 As discussed above, adopting similar 
programs elsewhere has led to dramatically lower recidivism rates.243 
What’s not to like about such a law? Critics of the law come from 
a number of perspectives. Some fear that the state’s financial 
commitment to the counties will be short-lived.244 My concerns are 
two-fold. My first concern is that the state left too much discretion to 
county governments, leaving in place the conditions that lead to 
unequal enforcement of the law. Similar policies have led to much 
higher incarceration rates for minority men.245 
My second criticism of realignment is what the law did not do. It 
left on the table numerous more ambitious measures that would have 
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provided the state with a more rational sentencing scheme and would 
have made greater savings in prison costs. Despite some confusion in 
the public’s mind,246 the law did not require the state to release 
anyone currently in prison.247 It does not address the unnecessarily 
expensive and sometimes unfair treatment of sex offenders.248 The 
law does not allow county-level supervision for third-strike offenders 
or any individual with a serious or violent offense.249 Finally, it does 
not put in place for the prison population about to be released similar 
evidence-based practices aimed at reducing that cohort’s recidivism 
rates.250 
If my conclusions are correct, California missed a unique 
opportunity to achieve much broader reforms. As developed in 
Section II above, the opportunity for broad sentencing reform occurs 
infrequently, when broad consensus emerges across the political 
divide.251 The discussion above begs another question: Why has it 
been so difficult for California, on many measures a progressive 
state, to enact broad reforms? I take up that as the topic for the final 
section.252 
VI. ELUSIVE REFORM 
As discussed above, some conservative states like Mississippi and 
Texas have adopted some progressive reforms in light of financial 
constraints.253 Over a decade ago, states less progressive than 
California, like North Carolina and Virginia, were able to enact 
sentencing commissions.254 Commentators often cite those states as 
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models for how to allocate rationally limited prison resources while 
protecting the public.255 So why has broad reform been so elusive in 
California? 
Around the country, early release for older prisoners—typically 
based on evidence-based criteria—is not controversial. States 
adopting Project for Older Prisoners (POP)256 programs have 
experienced significant savings by releasing older felons, who do not 
commit additional crimes.257 Mississippi, according to a recent story 
on the web, has saved $5 million over seven years by releasing 
eighty-nine terminally ill inmates.258 
By comparison, California first enacted a compassionate release 
statute in the late 1990s259 and then another, replacing the earlier act 
in 2010.260 But the state seldom grants parole for this target group 
even under the 2010 provision.261 Further, unlike early release 
programs elsewhere, in California, an offender granted medical 
parole must be returned to prison if his condition improves.262 
Early release programs in both states have their critics. For 
example, a victims’ rights group in Mississippi has questioned 
whether early release shows more compassion to prisoners than the 
offenders showed their victims.263 Despite its infrequent use and 
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significant restrictions, California’s program has similar critics 
among victims’ rights advocates.264 
Despite criticisms from victims’ rights groups, reforms have taken 
place in states like Mississippi, seemingly with a consensus among 
diverse political groups.265 The comparison to California is striking: 
California, a far more progressive state on a broad range of issues, 
has greater difficulty in achieving reform. 
As with medical parole, similar groups have already targeted 
realignment despite the fact that, at least if my analysis is correct, 
realignment is a modest reform effort.266 Notable are efforts by 
California’s Assembly Republicans, who have created a video 
attacking Governor Brown for risking public safety by backing 
realignment.267 The ad includes “scary-looking thugs and ominous 
music.”268 The Assembly Republicans have also created a website, 
California Crime Watch, where they will post information about 
increased criminal activity.269 Similarly, the Los Angeles County 
District Attorney has joined the criticism of realignment and has 
argued that the new law “casts too wide a net in defining ‘low level 
offenses.’”270 
Comparing California’s difficulty in achieving modest sentencing 
reform with broader efforts around the county invites a legitimate 
question: why does California have such a difficult time in achieving 
reform? A number of factors have coalesced over the past thirty 
years: anyone interested in identifying why California cannot reform 
its system should examine the role of the prison guards’ union,271 
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victim rights groups,272 myths surrounding the effect of Three 
Strikes,273 and term limits.274 Further, one cannot discuss the role of 
CCPOA and victims’ rights groups separately because of the union’s 
role in creating and supporting some of those groups.275 
Created in 1957 as a social club, the California Correctional 
Officers Association (CCOA) became a powerful political 
association during the 1980s.276 Under the tutelage of union President 
Don Novey beginning in 1980, the CCOA became the California 
Correctional Peace Officers Association.277 Novey took over at an 
ideal time for the growth of the union.278 Beginning with the 1968 
presidential election, conservatives made law-and-order a winning 
political strategy.279 The 1980s also saw the expansion of the war on 
drugs.280 After abandoning indeterminate sentencing in 1976, the 
legislature went on a binge from 1984 to 1991, during which it 
passed more than a thousand bills changing criminal laws, usually 
increasing prison sentences or changing misdemeanors to felonies.281 
With the increased prison population came a 600% increase in 
CCPOA’s membership from 1982 to 2001.282 
Not only were dues pouring in, but Novey understood the power of 
money in the political process. Since 1982, CCPOA has created at 
least eight PACs and “employed its political resources to reward 
friends, punish enemies, and construct the ‘specter of the CCPOA’—
an image of an omnipotent, unpredictable, and merciless labor 
organization.”283 The association has spread its largesse across the 
political aisle. For example, Governor Pete Wilson received $1 
million in donations from the CCPOA after he announced his support 
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for the three strikes law.284 Both recent Democratic Governors Davis 
and Brown have also received significant support from the union.285 
In 2010, CCPOA spent $7 million supporting 107 candidates; 104 of 
them were elected.286 
One measure of the union’s success is the pay scale for its 
members. Requiring only a high school education, officers make 
substantial incomes: one in ten officers make more than $100,000 a 
year.287 One effective political campaign resulted in a union contract 
spanning 2001 to 2006 in which the state agreed to match pay for 
CCPOA members with California Highway Patrol officers.288 
The CCPOA’s focus is not limited to member benefits. As part of 
its strategy to extend its power, the union has created victims’ rights 
groups.289 The CCPOA created both Crime Victims United of 
California (a political action committee) and the Doris Tate Crime 
Victims Bureau. Both groups have influenced public debate and 
political discussion of prison reform in California. These groups act 
as the unions’ alter egos. Crime Victims United of California is the 
vehicle through which the CCPOA donates to political issues.290 For 
many years the CCPOA has been Crime Victims United of 
California’s only donor.291 Although the union claims there is no 
ulterior motive to their involvement in victims’ rights, union 
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spokesman Lance Corcoran could not deny that the union benefited 
from the passage of laws mandating longer prison sentences.292 
Whether the group was created by the CCPOA or merely 
supported by the CCPOA, victims’ rights groups have crusaded 
against prison reform mechanisms such as early release and 
compassionate release of prisoners. Crime Victims United of 
California sued the state over the state’s day-for-day early release 
program.293 “The suit contends that the state Constitution prohibits 
the early release of prisoners because of crowding, that crime victims 
have a right to weigh in before an inmate is released and that the state 
is legally bound to provide adequate prisons.”294 Further, rumors of 
the union’s loss of political clout have proven overstated in light of 
its recent contract with Governor Brown. At least for now, the 
CCPOA is a force not easily opposed.295 
A discussion of the CCPOA’s relationship with victims’ rights 
organizations and victims’ rights advocates is not complete without 
mentioning Mike Reynolds. Reynolds became an activist after a 
repeat felon murdered his daughter.296 His efforts led to the passage 
of the “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law and the 10-20-Life law, 
both of which add years of incarceration to criminals sentenced under 
these provisions.297 He also opposes the early release and 
compassionate release of prisoners and warns of the dangers 
associated with releasing violent criminals in order to save money.298 
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Although the CCPOA publicly announced in the early 1990s that it 
would no longer support longer sentencing laws, the CCPOA has 
made numerous exceptions to that rule, most notably the Three 
Strikes Law.299 In 1994, the CCPOA contributed $100,000 to 
Reynolds’s campaign in support of the Three Strikes Law.300 Novey 
stated, “Mike Reynolds sought the assistance of CCPOA and we 
jumped on board—we were determined to help him rid our 
neighborhoods of violent felons. Three Strikes and You’re Out 
became our initiative.”301 Reports obtained from the Secretary of 
State’s office show that the CCPOA has vigorously opposed any 
attempt to reform the Three Strikes Law.302 Specifically, between 
1995 and 2003, the CCPOA lobbied against all seven reform bills.303 
Crime-victims groups opposed six of the seven reform bills.304 
Notably, Assembly Bill 109 excluded Three Strikes from its 
provisions.305 Even when the public seemed to support modest 
reforms to Three Strikes,306 then-Governor Schwarzenegger and the 
CCPOA led a last minute effort to defeat Proposition 66.307 In 2004, 
Proposition 66 would have required all strikes to be “violent” or 
“serious” and would have reduced the number of felonies that 
qualified as strikes.308 The CCPOA provided close to $750,000 to 
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fund the campaign against Proposition 66.309 The CCPOA created an 
organization to defeat Proposition 66 called Californians United for 
Public Safety (CUPS), comprised of law enforcement and victims’ 
rights groups.310 CUPS launched the “Felon a Day” campaign against 
Proposition 66, which released a mug shot and rap sheet of a felon 
every day who could have been released early by Proposition 66.311 
CUPS also sent out press releases, produced three television 
commercials, and created three radio spots to oppose Proposition 
66.312 
More recently, when moderate-conservative District Attorney 
Steve Cooley backed another even more modest ballot initiative to 
limit Three Strikes,313 leaders of the California District Attorneys 
Association caused him to withdraw from its board.314 Simply put, 
the Three Strikes Law has powerful allies and real staying power. But 
does the law deserve such strong adherence? 
The best explanation for Three Strikes’s staying power can be 
found in Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and You’re Out 
in California.315 There, Frank Zimring and his co-authors describe 
the powerful mythology built up around the law: until passage of 
Three Strikes, crime rates were on a steady incline; as soon as the law 
passed, crime rates showed a sharp decline that remained constant 
over time.316 But as the authors demonstrated, to make that claim, 
supporters of Three Strikes had to aggregate crime data for the three 
years prior to the passage of the law.317 A year-by-year analysis 
showed the decline beginning before passage of Three Strikes.318 
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Further, the authors’ empirical study demonstrated very limited 
benefits, if any at all, that result from a possible deterrent effect of 
the law.319 More importantly, other states have experienced even 
sharper drops in crime without the benefit of such expansive statutes 
as Three Strikes.320 
In reviewing Punishment and Democracy, I wrote, 
Economic arguments may influence voters and politicians. 
Polls suggest that voters are less enthusiastic about Three 
Strikes when they realize that it may require hard choices 
between further prison construction and education 
spending. The recent downturn in the state and national 
economies soon may make competition for scarce 
resources a reality again. California’s energy crisis 
demonstrates how quickly a budgetary surplus can 
disappear.321 
Subsequent developments, including the exemption of Three 
Strikes from Assembly Bill 109, prove that I was not a very good 
prognosticator. 
The influence of the CCPOA and victims’ rights groups is hardly a 
secret. Less obvious is the role of term limits put in place in 1990.322 
California recently enacted an initiative aimed at creating more 
competitive legislative districts.323 To date, however, most voting 
districts have been crafted to create safe seats for either party.324 As a 
result, members of the assembly, for example, have tended to 
                                                                                                                 
 319. Id. at 104–05. 
 320. Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Did “Three Strikes” Cause the Recent Drop in California 
Crime? An Analysis of the California Attorney General’s Report, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 128–29 
(1998); Franklin Zimring: “The Decline in Crime in New York City,” supra note 175. 
 321. Michael Vitiello, Punishment and Democracy: A Hard Look at Three Strikes’ Overblown 
Promises, 90 CAL. L. REV. 257, 287 (2002). 
 322. CAL. CONST. Amend. Initiative, Proposition 140 (approved Nov. 6, 1990). 
 323. Peter Schrag, Op-Ed., California Redistricting: Don’t Expect Any Magic, L.A. TIMES (June 14, 
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/14/opinion/la-oe-schrag-redistricting-20110614. 
 324. Editorial, The Politics of Redistricting in California, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/24/opinion/la-ed-redistricting-20111224. 
37
Vitiello: Alternatives to Incarceration: Why Is California Lagging Behind?
Published by Reading Room, 2012
1310 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:4 
represent the extreme wings of their respective parties.325 One might 
have thought Democrats interested in sentencing reform could enact 
legislation, for example, creating a sentencing commission, without 
fear of reprisals. That has not been the case. 
Elsewhere, I have speculated that the adoption of term limits goes 
a long way towards explaining the unwillingness of many liberal 
politicians from tackling reform. Consider a member of the assembly 
from one of the bluest districts in the state where constituents may 
favor reform.326 Why would that member of the assembly hesitate to 
propose or at least back reform? Term limits force that politician to 
think about the next political step in his or her career. That step often 
means making a run for the state senate and eventually statewide 
office.327 And while the assembly district may be deep blue, senate 
districts include a much larger and usually more conservative mix of 
voters.328 It may also include communities where state prisons are 
located, with the resulting economic dependence that those 
communities have on the status quo.329 
A second aspect of California politics helps to explain the lack of 
broader reform. Until a recent initiative created a non-partisan 
citizens’ board to oversee redistricting,330 California legislators 
effectively redrew their own districts.331 The resulting districts were 
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drawn to include large majorities of the incumbents’ own party.332 
Too often, legislators’ primary fear was a challenge from a more 
extreme member of their own party.333 As budget battles in 
California have demonstrated so often, Republicans have held ranks 
almost without exception.334 The lack of a single Republican vote for 
Assembly Bill 109 demonstrates the extent of party discipline. 
Further, in light of arguments by conservatives in favor of sentencing 
reform outside the political arena335 and the participation of 
conservative Republicans in other conservative states like Mississippi 
and Texas,336 Republican members of California’s legislature appear 
particularly irresponsible. 
I find the view from California truly perplexing. As indicated 
above, outside the political arena, a consensus has emerged across a 
broad political spectrum including some extreme conservatives that 
sentencing reform is imperative and that it can be done without 
risking public safety.337 Further, states more conservative than 
California have accomplished broader reform than has California.338 
In California, assembly Republicans are ready to pounce on 
Governor Brown’s modest reform.339 Democrats seem content with 
steps far short of the reform that the state needs.340 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Elsewhere, I have speculated how reform might come to 
California.341 Perhaps naively optimistic, I thought that an economic 
crisis might force the state to engage in meaningful reform.342 
Further, the three-judge panel seemed to offer the added incentive for 
broad reform.343 One must hope that California’s economic crisis 
does not get worse. Unless it does, the state may have missed its best 
chance for meaningful reform of the state’s sentencing scheme and 
bloated prison budget. 
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